Abstract. Principles of uranium isotope enrichment using various laser and gas centrifuge techniques are briefly discussed. Examples on production of high enriched uranium are given. Concerns regarding the possibility of using low end technologies to produce weapons grade uranium are explained. Based on current assessments commercial enrichment services are able to cover the global needs of enriched uranium in the foreseeable future.
INTRODUCTION
Commercial uranium enrichment companies are currently operating in China (China National Nuclear Corporation, CNNC), France (AREVA). Germany (URENCO), the Netherlands (URENCO), the Russian Federation (ROSATOM), the United Kingdom (URENCO), and USA (USEC and URENCO). These enterprises have a total annual enrichment capacity of 65 million separative work units (SWU) 1 , which is well above the annual demand of about 45 million SWU. In addition, smaller enrichment facilities exist in Argentina, Brazil, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan and Pakistan.
There are several uranium enrichment methods (See Annex 1), but only gas diffusion, gas centrifuges, and SILEX are of relevance on commercial scale. The world's oldest operating enrichment plant -the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant in the United States ended its commercial operation in 2013. But new gas centrifuge enrichment plants will be built or current ones expanded. At the same time, the Global Laser Enrichment Facility (GLE) in Wilmington using laser enrichment technology is approaching its commercialization phase. With the onset of new gas centrifuge enrichment capacities, the World Nuclear Association expects that there will be in 2020 87 million SWU available to satisfy the estimated need of 60 million SWU 2 . Most of the world's enriched uranium will be produced by AREVA, CNNC, GLE, ROSATOM, and URENCO. In the light of these developments, there should be fairly little economical or security reasons for another country or commercial entity to embark on large enrichment projects elsewhere.
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS OF GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT
Proliferation concerns arise from the dual use nature of uranium enrichment. The same centrifuges (and also laser enrichment equipment) can be used to produce -with fairly straightforward modifications -weapons grade (normally enriched to higher than 90 % U-235) uranium in place of low enriched uranium. From the safeguards point of view, there are three basic diversion strategies to accomplish this: diversion from declared enriched uranium inventory; unreported production of excess low enriched uranium; or of high enriched uranium. In the first two cases, uranium has to be transported to a clandestine facility to be further enriched to weapons grade. The basic IAEA verification scheme that was established in the early 1980's ( so called Hexapartite Safeguards Approach ) had various shortcomings that was inadequate in addressing such diversion attempts. The Agency's safeguards strategies were however further developed over time when the enrichment plants and throughputs grew larger, and when the cascades designs became more flexible. The current IAEA verification approach includes process monitoring, announced and unannounced inspections to cover all three diversion scenarios mentioned above 3 . The IAEA has established a significant quantity (SQ), which is a defined amount required by a rogue state to produce enough nuclear material for first nuclear device. One SQ is 25 kg U-235 or approximately 28 kg weapons grade uranium. It takes 5000-5500 SWU to produce one SQ of weapons grade uranium from natural uranium feed. As an example, using a German G-2 centrifuge which has a capacity is ca 5 SWU/year 4 , about one thousand such centrifuges are required to produce a significant quantity from natural uranium in one year's time. With 2000 such centrifuges, it would take half a year; and with 4000 thousand centrifuges, about 3 months. As shown in Figure 1 , the time required to produce one significant quantity using enriched uranium as a feed is much shorter. If one uses typical light water reactor fuel product as a feed, more than half of the enrichment effort required to produce weapons grade material is already accomplished. If the feed is a typical research reactor fuel material, ca 20 % U-235, 90 % effort required is already accomplished. With 4000 G-2 centrifuges, it would take about one and half months to produce enough material for a single nuclear device from 4-5 % feed. If the feed is 20% enriched uranium, a couple of weeks is enough to produce material for a single nuclear device. G-2 centrifuges were developed in 1960s-1970s, but modern centrifuges such as Russian, URENCO TC12 or TC21, or American centrifuges have separative powers of 4-8, 40-45 or 80, or 350 SWU/year per machine, respectively. The first generation Iranian centrifuge, IR-1, which is based the old Dutch SNOR/CNOR design obtained through A. Q. Khan (Pakistan) has, according to the IAEA reports, a capacity of slightly less than 1 SWU/year machine 5 . This lower than expected performance -it should be 2-3 SWU/year per machine -could be a combination of design and manufacturing problems, and lower grade raw materials used in the production of centrifuges. However, Iran has produced with IR-1 centrifuges since 2007 more than 11 tons UF6 enriched up to 5 % U-235, and 450 kg UF6 with 20 % U-235. If these are further enriched to weapons grade uranium, the amount is sufficient for half a dozen nuclear devices. With the IR-1 centrifuges available in Natanz and Fordow in February 2014, weapons grade material enough for a first nuclear device can be produced in two months time. 
LASER ENRICHMENT
It appears that from the laser-based processes (See Annex 2) only the SILEX method of GLE would be utilized on a commercial scale. There is a lively debate going on as to whether the development and deployment of laser enrichment technology presents an undue proliferation risk of enrichment technology 7 . GLE proponents assert that its laser enrichment secrets are well protected and the technical and financial barriers of laser enrichment technology make its spread unlikely. On the other hand, opponents point out that the laser process require less physical space and use less power, and add to proliferation concerns that such a technology renders a secret facility less detectable to the outside world, compared to similar 'traditional' centrifuge enrichment plants. Yet, while this is an internal debate taking place within the United States with attention to global ramifications, as the proliferation cases in Iran and South Korea have shown, the genie -the basic know-how on laser enrichment -is already in public domain. A good example of it is a literature study made by the Iranian laser scientists. 8 The Iranian case also demonstrates that after acquisition of basic AVLIS technology from foreign sources, one can proceed indigenously with the production of lasers, noting that Iran has an extensive laser R&D base. Laser installations have a fairly small footprint, and no "tell tale" indicators, which can be observed e.g. from the satellite imagery. However, it is demanding to develop AVLIS to a continuous process since the feed material is uranium metal, and the collectors have to be also removed from a vacuum separation vessel. Due to the nature of the process, quite a lot of uranium remain in liners. While in the middle of the collectors material is weapons grade, also lower enrichments are trapped in collectors, which reduces the actual yield making the AVLIS less attractive compared to gas centrifuge process.
SUMMARY
Commercial enrichment services are able to cover the needs of enriched uranium in the foreseeable future. Gas centrifuges are dominating enrichment technology. The SILEX process may cover a small percentage of enrichment services during the coming decade. Overall, however, there is little commercial justifications to develop additional enrichment capacity beyond the planned capacity extensions of the current six service provides, Both gas centrifuge and laser enrichment processes can be changed with minor modifications in a relative short time to produce weapons grade uranium. Fundamentals of both technologies are available in the open literature. Manufacturing of centrifuge rotors requires maraging steel, carbon fiber and or high strength aluminum, which are subject strict export controls. One can, however, sacrifice the speed of rotors and accept lower performance, which makes it possible to make rotors from materials of lower quality. Thus, with expanding the knowledge on material sciences and access to modern machine tools, such low technology centrifuges are within a reach of increasing number of states. 11 • Electromagnetic isotope separation 12 • Chemical methods 13 • Plasma separation 14 
ANNEX 1. URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROCESSES

ANNEX 2: LASER ENRICHMENT
The mass difference between isotopes of a same element results in slight variations in the properties of the electronic clouds, which provides the possibility to excite U-235 selectively from other uranium isotopes. Using lasers to excite atoms or molecules of U-235 is the first step in the laser induced isotope separation process. The next step is then extract and collect the U-235 atoms or molecules. There are three laser processes, which have been developed beyond laboratory scale experiments: Atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS), Molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS), and Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX). The only process reaching industrial scale operations is SILEX.
Atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS)
In the AVLIS process, uranium metal atom is selectively ionized with a laser beam. Traditionally tunable copper vapor lasers (CVL) were used produce the selective wavelength to excite U-235 atoms, which were then collected to a target as shown below.
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Molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS)
In the MLIS process uranium hexafluoride molecule with U-235 is first selectively excited by an infra red laser and the dissociated by another laser (infra red or ultraviolet laser). The resulted uranium penta fluoride (UF5) precipitates while the feed and tail materials remain as a UF6 gas. MLIS was developed in the 1970 to 1990 period. While the first step of providing selective molecular laser excitation was technically straightforward, the second MLIS step of "harvesting" excited isotopic species from unexcited ones, proved to be more difficult 16 . Thus the method has not proceeded to industrial scale.
Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation (SILEX)
Details of the SILEX process are classified, but the excitation mechanism is known to be similar to MLIS, where U-235 is selectively excited. In this process, UF6 is fed to the separation cell with a carrier gas 17 , which is cooled to achieve sufficient separation for the resonance peaks of uranium isotopes. The system uses CO2 infrared lasers, which are converted to the desired 16 micrometer wavelength in a Raman cell. In this process, feed, product, and tails remains as UF6, and the carrier gas, which specifics are proprietary information, is recycled.
